Sure Win, Risky Loss

Jean LaRoche, FRAeS
Director of Research & Development
CQFA - Chicoutimi College

 

Despite all the Human Factors training received, the safety advices read
and the procedures framing the operations, pilots remain human beings using
the fundamental reasoning of the species developed over hundreds of thousand years.

 

As part of the normal discharge of their operational duties, pilots keep threats, errors and undesired aircraft states from reducing margins of safety in flight operations. Flight crews dedicate significant amounts of time and energy to insure adequate margins of safety at all times. Empirical observations from the University of Texas during training and checking suggest that as much as 70% of flight crew activities serve to identify and manage operational threats, such as adverse weather conditions, terrain, flight automation or approach complexity.  

When facing operational risks, pilots constantly analyze the options and make decisions. Despite all the Human Factors training received, the safety advices read and the procedures framing the operations, pilots remain human beings using the fundamental reasoning developed over hundreds of thousand years. Why else would a pilot continue a VFR flight into instrument meteorological condition despite all the warnings received during flight training? Why continue an unstable approach all the way to ground impact and not simply go around? How else can we explain why a pilot takes off with an overweight floatplane from a small lake surrounded by mountains? What urges someone to reduce the safety margins? Can a similarity be drawn between the risks of games of chance and those of aviation? 

Keep or greed?

Would you bet $10 on the flip of a coin if you stood to win $30 for your call. So you've got a 50% chance of winning 0 and a 50% chance of winning $30. Repeat the offer several times within the population to find out how many will accept the challenge. This mathematically a good bet to take and yet studies show that only a minority of people will. Most will keep their $10 and walk away. 

Psychologists have found that this situation tends always to lead to the same results: when facing a sure keep ($10) or a risky win (an additional $20), many people tend to choose the sure keep. Those people analyze the situation not by considering the possibility of a win (10 + 20 = $30), but rather by the possibility of a loss (-$10).

Fear of losing

Imagine the player owes $1000. He can either pay now (sure loss) or gamble on the flip of a coin (risky loss.) Heads, the debt is reduced to $600. Tails, the debt increases to $1400. Which option will the player take? To avoid losing more, the player should choose the sure loss of $1000. When surveyed, most people don't. When facing a sure loss, suddenly people become risk seekers.
 
Nobel Prize-winner Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky researched the strange way in which people make decisions in risky situations. Until then, risky decisions were usually analyzed by thinking about the total wealth involved. When you look at the winning bet above in the context of the total wealth it makes sense to gamble simply because you have more to gain than you have to lose. So, why do people tend not to? Kahneman and Tversky suggested that people people base their decision-making calculations on the variations in wealth. Furthermore, it turns out that at low levels of risk, such as the coin flip situation, people are more averse to the loss of $10 than they are attracted by the chance of winning the $30. Studies have shown that people actually need the chance of winning $40 before they'll consider risking their own $10.

Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory (1979) describes how people show illogical risk aversion in some circumstances and risk-seeking behavior in other circumstances. The movie A Better Life (Cedric Kahn, 2011) eloquently shows how irrational human beings are when about to lose everything. Should we think pilots are a breed exempt from illogicality?

In the cockpit

Adverse meteorological conditions often present pilots with painful choice: fail to complete the mission by not bringing the passengers where they intended to go, or push beyond the pilot's or the aircraft's capabilities. Isn't this the exact scenario we have taught pilots for decades? We now know that the sure loss (the option to turn around and not land at the planned destination) goes against human nature. Indeed, when facing a sure loss, humans tend to gamble against all odds, especially if the intended destination isn't that far anymore. Accident investigators know too well how beneficial it is to turn around. But all the pilots who have turned around in similar circumstances will tell you how much rationalization and mental effort was needed and how doubtful they remained afterward.
 
Humans are not as rational as we would like to think but Human Factors training can help curb some fundamental reactions. Kahneman and Tversky suggest that next time you agonize over a decision in terms of losses, try this simple trick. Re-imagine the whole decision in terms of gain:  a gain in time, in income (by making two flights instead of one overloaded) or in trust from your clients. A slight switch in perception may transcend your own nature and save lives.  

KAHNEMAN, D. & A. Tversky (1979). «Prospect theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk », Economeirica, no 47, p. 313-327.

Summit Entertainment, Lime Orchard Production (2011) A Better Life. Chris Weitz, Director.

 

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Jean LaRoche has been training Canadian Approved Check Pilots, Training Captains, and Inspectors for 30 years. He is a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society for his work in Human Factors and the AQTA 2019 Fecteau Award. He coauthored the WOMBAT psychological test. He can be reached by email at jlaroche@cqfa.ca

From the same author:
Pilot's Restricted Right To Medical Confidentiality 
Cannabis and Pilots

Sure Win, Risky Loss 
Decision-Making: Missing The Sixth Element
Unstable Approaches: Training the 97%
The Pseudoscience of Flight Simulation Motion 

 

Founded in 1968, CQFA (photo above) is the national aeronautics institute of Quebec's Ministry for Education, Higher Education, Research and Science. Since more than 30 years, CQFA's Continuing Education Department, located at Montreal-Trudeau International Airport, serves the aviation industry in Canada and abroad. www.cqfa.ca